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OPEN-MARKET TRANSACTIONS
reiterating that a tenancy by the entirety is not subject to the separate
debts of either spouse. Justice Sharp in a concurring opinion 4 said the
main question was whether it would be a fraudulent conveyance for a
debtor H to convey to W his interest in income producing property held
by the entirety. She concluded that such a transfer would not be fraudu-
lent. She reasoned that land owned by the entireties is not subject to the
claims of either spouse's creditors and an individual creditor's lien can
not attach to the property unless the debtor spouse survives. The income,
rents, and profits are personalty, not realty. In conveying his interest to
W, H transfers the realty, which includes as an incident the right to all
the profits, but does not actually convey the personalty. Therefore the
transfer is not fraudulent since the property conveyed, i.e., entirety prop-
erty, could not be reached initially by the creditors to satisfy any indi-
vidual claims against H.
This conclusion may initially seem unfair to creditors, but it is the
only reasonable one considering the relevant incident of the estate by the
entirety, i.e., immunity from individual debts of the spouses. Since the
spouses can convey the entire fee to a third party, they should be able
together to convey the fee to either one or the other. If its income pro-
ducing nature were to prevent the transfer of the entirety property be-
cause a fraud on creditors, the practical effect would be a restraint on
alienation since potential purchasers would be concerned that a transfer
could be set aside by creditors. The contrary argument, of course, is that
the conveyance can be set aside only if it was made with the intent to
defraud or hinder creditors. Thus, H and W need only negate any proof
of intent to overcome the voiding of the transfer.
3 5
ROBERT A. WICKER
Securities Regulation-Application of Rule lob-5 to Open-Market
Transactions
Securities trading in the United States is growing each year. Daily
volume on the New York Stock Exchange now averages in excess of ten
Id. at 553, 161 S.E.2d at 28.
Since H alone is entitled to the rents and profits, if he assigned only his right
to the income, individual creditors might successfully contend that this was a fraudu-
lent transfer, provided the intent to defraud were present. In this instance H con-
veys not the land, but the personal property itself to defraud creditors, and the court
has ruled that the rents and profits can be reached by individual creditors.
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million shares, which represents an estimated monetary value of five
hundred million dollars. Yet these transactions represent only a fraction
of the total open-market transactions in the United States because there
are dozens of other organized exchanges and an even larger over-the-
counter market.
The public securities market is unique in that it is normally central-
ized, efficient, and highly sensitive in an economic sense. Theoretically,
prices are determined by supply and demand, which in turn are heavily
influenced by the information available about a particular security and
general economic conditions. If a corporation whose stock is publicly
traded were to issue any false information about its condition, a buyer
or seller in the open-market who relied on this information could suffer
severe losses. It would seem that if the investor has been wronged, he
should be able to recover his losses; but the solution is not that simple.
In the recent case of Heit v. Weitzen,' the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit addressed itself to this important question. This appeal
represented the consolidation of two actions from the district court2 that
raised the same issues on essentially the same facts. In both cases, plain-
tiffs alleged that defendants, Belock Instrument Corporation and its direc-
tors, misrepresented the earnings of the corporation for fiscal year 1964
by failing to disclose that a substantial amount of its reported income
was derived from various fraudulent overcharges on government con-
tracts." Relying on the misrepresentations contained in Belock's annual
report, press releases, and documents filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission,4 plaintiffs purchased Belock5 securities on the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange and later allegedly suffered losses. At no time dur-
ing the alleged fraud, however, did defendant corporation or any of its
"insiders" trade in these securities. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contended
1402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S.
Jan. 2, 1969) (No. 894).
2Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), noted in 35 FoRD. L.
REv. 565 (1967), and Howard v. Levine, 262 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
S'On August 18, 1965, the grand jury in the Eastern District of New York re-
turned a forty-one count indictment against certain officers of Belock charging them
with presentation of false claims to the government. Brief for Appellee at 4, Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
'Hereinafter referred to as the SEC.
'On March 1, 1967, the name of defendant Belock was changed to Applied




that such actions by defendants violated section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19346 and SEC Rule 10b-57 promulgated thereunder.'
In both cases, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that
the alleged violation of rule 10b-5 did not occur "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" as required by the rule, since neither
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964), reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
' SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
' In addition to plaintiffs' rule lOb-S cause of action at issue in this case, plain-
tiffs also alleged that defendants had violated section 18(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964), which provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any
rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registra-
tion statement provided in subsection .(d) of section 78o of this title, which
statement was at the time and in light of the circumstances under which
it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall
be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or
misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or
sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages
caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted
in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or mis-
leading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction ....
Plaintiffs contended that Belock's annual report and the "10K Report" (a detailed
document similar to an annual report), which were submitted by Belock to the
SEC, constituted "filed" documents within the meaning of section 18(a). The
court of appeals in Heit upheld the lower court decision that the copies of the
annual report submitted to the SEC were not "filed" documents within section
18(a). See SEC Rule 14a-3(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1968). But the court
did rule that the "10K Report" was a "filed" document within section 18(a) and
remanded this point on the question of reliance. 402 F.2d at 914-17.
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the corporation nor its "insiders" used the fraud for their own benefit.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs did have
a sufficient cause of action under rule 10b-5, and reversed and remanded
the case for trial on the merits. In so holding, the court of appeals
adopted the same broad interpretation of rule 10b-5 in private actions
for damages that it used in the recent decision of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,10 which was primarily an SEC enforcement proceeding.
The implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur have already elicited a voluminous
literature,-1 yet Heit may have even greater implications for the business
community.
'Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Howard v. Levine, 262
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
10401 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968), reang and aff'g in part 258 F. Supp. 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Because this case bears directly on Heit, it is essential to set
out some pertinent facts and part of the court's holding. In October, 1963, officials
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company began exploring for ore on the Canadian
Shield near Timmins, Ontario. Early results were extremely encouraging and
further sampling continued until April, 1964. Between October, 1963, and April,
1964, certain persons associated with the company bought large quantities of the
company's stock in the open market. However, no disclosure of the discovery
was made until April 12, 1964, when the company issued a press release that con-
firmed that the company was exploring the area but that results were uncertain.
Yet on April 16, 1964, just four days later, the company made full disclosure of a
huge discovery. During that four day period, certain "insiders" continued to pur-
chase stock.
As a result of these actions, the SEC brought an action against the company
and the individual "insiders." The SEC sought an injunction against the company
on the grounds that the company's press release of April 12, 1964, was deceptive
and sought rescission of the transactions by the alleged "insiders." The district
court held substantially for the defendants. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F.
Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). On the issue of the press release, the district court
ruled that the April 12 release did not violate rule lOb-5 because it was not issued
for the purpose of benefiting the corporation. The court also noted that there was
no evidence that any "insider" used the release to his personal advantage. Fur-
thermore, the district court did not feel the release was really misleading, based
on the facts known at the time by the company. Id. at 292-96. In reversing the
decision of the trial court, the court of appeals held that the true test was whether
the release was misleading to the reasonable investor, regardless of whether
the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officers for ulterior purposes,
and remanded the case on this point. 401 F.2d at 857-64. In so holding, the
court gave rule lOb-5 a very broad construction and the references hereinafter
to the I exas Gulf Sulphur case are to the language of the court on this point. As
a result of this decision, there are now over one hundred suits pending in the
Southern District of New York by private investors against the company and its
officers for violations of rule lOb-5.
" For discussions of the district court case, see, e.g., Fleischer, Securities
Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271 (1965) ; Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf
Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAW. 1057 (1965); Ruder, Corporate
Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The Codification Implica-
[Vl. 47
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Since rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942 by the SEC, its use has
greatly expanded to cover many different types of securities fraud. 2 The
most prevalent application of the rule is in cases where two parties are
dealing "directly"' 3 with each other, i.e., each party knows with whom he
is dealing. 4 For example, a common rule lOb-5 case involves fraud in
the sale of securities in a close corporation from one party to another.
Originally, the only remedy under rule lOb-5 was injunctive relief in an
SEC enforcement proceeding. Later, however, an implied civil action
for damages developed to compensate investors for their losses.'5
Open-market transactions are "indirect" and "impersonal"' 6 in the
sense that the parties to a transaction are usually unknown to each other
and their communication is through some impersonal media. For this
reason, Congress and the SEC have developed an articulated policy of
keeping the market informed and free of manipulation. This is reflected
in the fact that Congress, the SEC, and the major market institutions
require prompt release of earnings and other significant developments
by publicly traded corporations. 17 Moreover, the SEC has the broad
power to suspend trading in any security when it feels the information
available about a security is unreliable. 8
Yet the impersonal nature of the open-market transaction has delayed
the development of remedies in the form of private civil actions for
damages uider rule lOb-5. The rule expressly requires that a violation
tions of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 872 (1967). For discussion of the
recent court of appeals decision, see Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second
Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63
Nw. U.L. REV. 423 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ruder]; Comment, Securities
Regulation: SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 44 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 252 (1968); Com-
ment, Insider Share Trading-Trading Without Disclosure of Prospective Mine
Held to Violate Rule 10b-5, 14 VILL. L. REv. 140 (1968).
1"-For background in the area covered by this note, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1757-97 (2d ed. 1961). For an excellent analysis of rule lOb-5, see
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FAuD---SEC RULE 1OB-5 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as BROMBERG]. See also Comment, Fraud in Securities Transactions and
Rule lOb-5-A Survey of Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. REv. 599 (1968).
" The terms "direct, .... indirect," and "impersonal" are part of the Bromberg
classification of rule lob-5 cases. See BROMBERG § 3.1, at 62.
14 Id. §§ 4.1-6.5.
'Id. §§ 2.4(1)-(2).
20 Id. §§ 7.1-.4.
'E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8m (1964).
"'Id. § 19(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. 78s(a) (4) (1964) (exchange); id. § 15(c) (5),
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (3) (over-the-counter). The SEC suspended trading in Belock
securities on June 22, 1965, when the irregularities involved in this case came
to light. Trading was resumed November 9, 1965. Brief for Appellee at 12, Heit
v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
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occur "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Courts
initially interpreted this clause narrowly, thus restricting the application
of the rule. First, they adopted the common law notion of fraud, by
holding that the "in connection with" clause required that privity of
contract exist between the defrauded party and the defendant." Con-
ceivably, the privity requirement could have prevented any application of
the rule to open-market transactions since one who buys or sells rarely,
if ever, knows the party on the other side of the transaction. The privity
requirement, however, has begun to disappear, first in SEC enforcement
proceedings, and now in private actions, as courts have realized that the
rule has to be relaxed in order to protect the public in the expanding
securities market.20 Despite the trend away from requiring privity, the
issue is still debatable as both sides in Heit felt compelled to argue the
point in their briefs.2 '
In addition to the privity requirement, other restrictions have grown
up around the "in connection with" clause to hinder the rule 10b-5 plain-
tiff. One of these restrictions deals with the defendant's state of mind.
In Heit the facts indicated that the "purpose" of the fraudulent reports
by Belock and its directors was not to inflate the market price of the stock
but rather to conceal certain fraudulent overcharges from the govern-
ment.22 Both trial court decisions relied heavily on this point in their
dismissals. In Howard v. Levine,23 District Judge Cooper held that one
of the prime defects in plaintiff's cause of action was that "[w]hatever
fraud is alleged here ...is directed against the government, notwith-
19 See Comment, Fraud in Securities Transactions and Ride lOb-5-A Survey
of Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. REv. 599, 601-02 (1968).
2 See BROMBERG §§ 2.5(3), 8.5.
2 Brief for Appellants at 14-26, Brief for Appellees at 17-23, Heit v. Weitzen,
402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). Apparently, the parties argued the privity require-
ment because an earlier Second Circuit case had dismissed a rule lob-5 complaint
when plaintiff failed to allege "[a] semblance of privity between the vendor and
purchaser of the security." Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), atf'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
Some courts have rejected Farnsworth. See, e.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A.,
Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-
1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964). Several
recent decisions in the Second Circuit seem to reject it. New Park Mining Co. v.
Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211
F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). A 1967 Second Circuit case, Mutual Shares Corp.
v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), casts grave doubt on it, and Het
seems completely to overrule it.
22402 F.2d at 913. See note 3 supra.
2262 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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standing its possible incidental market impact."24  Similarly, District
Judge Sugarman in Heit v. Weitzeni5 stated:
The fraud against the Government in overcharging it on the contract
having been already accomplished, the concealment thereof from the
filed statements was for the purpose of further defrauding the Govern-
ment by not disclosing the original malfeasance and not for the purpose
of perpetrating a "misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually
associated with the sale or purchase of securities.
'2
6
Thus the trial courts agreed with defendants that the alleged violation
could not have been "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" because the fraud was not aimed at the market.
The court of appeals, however, relying on its recent decision in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,2 7 construed the "in connection with" require-
ment broadly and carried over the Texas Gulf Sulphur holding that the
clause was satisfied whenever a device was employed" ' of a sort that would
cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith,
so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities.' "2
Although Texas Gulf Sulphur was primarily an SEC enforcement pro-
ceeding, the Heit court showed no reluctance in carrying over the same
rule to private actions for damages:
"Rule lOb-5 is violated whenever assertions are made ... in a manner
reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means
of the financial media ... if such assertions are false or misleading or
are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of
the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.
'29
The court concluded by saying:
It is reasonable to assume that investors may very well rely on the
material contained in false corporate financial statements which have
been disseminated in the market place, and in so relying may subse-
quently purchase securities of the corporation. The "ulterior motive"
present in the instant case-the concealment of the fraud from the
government-is irrelevant, since the false information was circulated
2
1 Id. at 645.
2'260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
20 Id. at 602.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
402 F.2d at 913, quoting from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
860 (2d Cir. 1968).
" 402 F.2d at 913, quothig from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
862 (2d Cir. 1968).
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to a large segment of the investing public. It is impossible to isolate the
particular "fraudulent" acts and consider them as directed toward the
government alone.80
The court seems to be saying that although a much clearer case could
be made out under rule 10b-5 if it could be shown that defendants'
actions were "deliberate," i.e., with an intent to injure, the rule is still
satisfied if defendants' state of mind can be termed "knowing," i.e., with
knowledge that others will be misled even though there is no intent to
injure.3 This holding appears clearly justified" in light of the stated
policy of rule 10b-5 to protect the innocent investor and furthermore
accords with the common law concept that the law presumes every man to
intend the natural consequences of his acts,3 3 even though his true
''motive" is different.
A third problem in the case, in addition to that of privity and state
of mind, was that at no time did the corporation or any of its "insiders"
trade in the securities or in any way seek to benefit from the alleged
fraud in the market. For this reason, defendants contended that the
rule 10b-5 requirement that a violation occur "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" could never be satisfied where the
defendants take no action whatsover to benefit from the fraud.34 The
district courts agreed with defendants and relied on this point as one
basis for the dismissal of plaintiffs' cases." Again, however, the court
of appeals disagreed with the district courts, relying on Texas Gulf
Sulphur, and held that "[t]here is no necessity for contemporaneous
trading in securities by insiders or by the corporation itself"', in order
to satisfy the "in connection with" clause.
13 402 F.2d at 913.
31 There are actually five classifications commonly used to describe defendant's
state of mind: deliberate, knowing, reckless, negligent, and innocent. See Ruder
436-37.
Cf. id. at 441-42.
, Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81, 95 (1884). Indications are
that the Supreme Court would probably agree. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the Court, in interpreting the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1964), said it would defeat the mani-
fest purpose of that Act to "require proof of intent to injure." 375 U.S. at 195.
Moreover, since the common law recognizes this form of intent, it is doubtful that
courts would interpret rule 10b-5 to be more strict. Royal Air Prop., Inc. v. Smith,
312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962).
Brief for Appellee at 17-23, Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d. Cir. 1968).
32Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Howard ,. Levine,
262 F. Supp. 643, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
36402 F.2d at 913.
OPEN-MARKET TRANSACTIONS
In most rule lOb-5 cases, the requirements of the "in connection with"
clause are met because the parties are in privity. It is in a non-privity
context that the clause poses problems. The holding in Heit that there
is no necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities by insiders or
the corporation constitutes the broadest interpretation yet in a non-privity
case of the "in connection with" clause. Although this same interpreta-
tion was used by the same court in Texas Gulf Sulphur, that case as
pointed out was only an SEC enforcement proceeding and obviously there
was speculation as to whether the Texas Gulf Sulphur interpretation
would be, or should be, carried over to private actions .
7
Perhaps the broadest interpretation of the "in connection with" clause
in a non-privity context before Texas Gulf Sulphur and Heit came in
the fairly recent open-market case, Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Inc.",
In Freed, management of a widely held over-the-counter firm made a
false prediction as to the combined earnings of it and a privately held
company with whom it proposed to merge. By the use of this false pre-
diction of earnings, management hoped to induce shareholder approval
of the proposed merger. Apparently, management's predictions were so
optimistic that the price of the company's stock doubled in two and
one-half months. Plaintiffs, who were open-market purchasers during
that period, sued the company after its annual report revealed that actual
earnings were only half of the prediction and plaintiffs had sold their
shares at substantial losses.
In sustaining plaintiff's claim against a motion to dismiss, the court
apparently felt that the "in connection with" clause was satisfied, despite
the absence of corporate or insider trading, because management had
issued the false report in order to facilitate shareholder approval of the
pending merger. 9 Thus, in Freed the fraud was at least aimed at the
market and management did use the scheme to benefit it in a stock-related
venture. Heit, however, carries the Freed interpretation one step further,
because the scheme was aimed at the government, not the shareholders.
What the court in Heit ultimately had to decide was exactly to whom
the "in connection with" clause applied. Before Heit, the clause had been
universally applied by courts to rule lOb-5 plaintiffs in civil cases, i.e., the
courts had interpreted "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
"' E.g., Ruder 423.
28 [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEC. L. Rni. 91,317 (N.D.'Il.
1964).
" BROMBERG § 7.2(2), at 150.
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security" to mean that a rule lOb-5 plaintiff in civil cases must be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities.40 Heit continues this interpretation. But
the primary question raised in Heit was whether the clause also applies
to a rule lOb-5 defendant-more specifically, must defendant have traded
in securities with the plaintiff or at least with a third party? The court
held that the fundamental policy behind rule lOb-5, to protect investors,
required a rule in which only plaintiff need be involved in a securities
transaction. Otherwise, a corporate defendant would be immune from
liability for false statements that caused damage as long as it did not
trade in securities.
Heit raises difficult and what could be termed frightening questions.
The reaction in the business community to its immediate predecessor,
Texas Gulf Sulphur, was one of great alarm.4' Needless to say, in
carrying over the Texas Gulf Sulphur tests to private actions, Heft will
create even more fear in corporate board rooms. The critical questions at
this point are whether Heit was correctly decided, and, if so, should it be
extended to cover other situations.
In order to make any decisions on these issues, it is important to
isolate the factors that should be considered in determining liability under
rule lOb-5.42 Three factors appear throughout the decisions under rule
lOb-5-the relation of the parties (privity versus no privity), the state of
defendant's mind, and the general policies behind rule lOb-5. All of these
factors have been thoroughly discussed and debated by writers as they
were in Heit. One factor, however, seems to be of critical importance
and yet receives very little attention in the reported decisions-the amount
of damages a defendant would have to pay if he were held liable under
rule lOb-5.4" Apparently, one reason for this omission is that most re-
ported decisions under rule lOb-5 discuss only whether there is a cause
of action and do not reach the remedy issue. In fact, most rule lOb-5
"0 See Comment, Fraud in Securities Transactions and Ride lOb-5-A Survey of
Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. REv. 599, 601-05 (1968), pointing out the
problems in defining purchaser or seller.
"The Wall Street Journal, August 29, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
42 E.g., Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations under Rile 10b-5, 32 U. Cur .
L. REv. 824 (1965); Comment, Civil Liability under Section lOB and Rile 1OB-5:
A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
For an excellent analysis of potential liability under rule 10b-5, see Ruder, supra
note 9. He uses a classification based on several factors: privity versus non-
privity, misrepresentation versus nondisclosure, and state of mind (deliberate,
knowing, reckless, negligent, or innocent). The conclusions drawn hereinafter in




cases do not reach trial on the merits, but are settled out of court.44 This
policy of defendants to avoid the remedy issue may be a tactical error
because a court fully apprised of the potential liabilities of a defendant
might take a different view of the case. It is difficult, however, to esti-
mate what the liability of the Belock Instrument Corporation or Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company would be. However, some estimates are available
on the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company. Assuming a rescission measure
of damages for all those who sold their stock during the fraudulent
period,4 5 Texas Gulf Sulphur's liability to private investors could range
as high as 390 million dollars, some 150 million dollars greater than the
company's net worth. Although Texas Gulf Sulphur's liability may be
"BROMBERG § 1.3(2).
' The issue of damages is one of the most perplexing problems surrounding rule
10b-5 violations in the open market. In a trial on the merits, plaintiff must prove
that defendant's conduct caused his losses. Because of the multiple factors that can
influence the market, causation is often hard to determine. For example, the court
of appeals in Texas Gilf Sulphur admitted that the evidence as to the effect of the
press release on the investing public was equivocal and less than abundant. 401
F.2d at 846.
The nature of the remedy is further complicated by the impersonal nature of
the open market. If a corporation issues false information that is misleadingly
pessimistic and that enables insiders to buy stock from defrauded sellers, almost
all would agree that the profits of the insiders should be returned. Insider profits,
however, will never equal the total loss of all sellers unless insiders were the only
buyers in the market at the time of the fraud. In most cases, there are likely to be
many innocent buyers in the market who reap a windfall gain by purchasing the
security at less than its intrinsic worth. Of course, all losses by sellers would be
windfall gains to innocent buyers in cases similar to Heit where neither the corpo-
ration nor its insiders trade in the securities.
One solution to this problem would be to find out exactly who sold to the
insiders as a result of the fraud and rescind the transactions. Yet this solution is
less than satisfactory. As pointed out, it is not the transactions of -the insiders
that cause losses to investors, but rather the misrepresentations. Those who sell
in the open market and wind up in unwitting privity with the insiders should not
have a stronger claim for recovery than all the other investors who sold during
the period. The only solution is to hold the defendant liable for the losses of all
sellers, regardless of whether there was insider trading.
The final question that remains is the appropriate measure of damages. At least
two theories are feasible. One theory, the out-of-pocket theory, would award
the defrauded seller the difference between what he received for the stock at the
time of sale and its intrinsic worth at the time. The second theory, a rescission
measure of damages, would produce higher damages, as the measure is the differ-
ence between the sale price and the value of the stock when the fraud is remedied.
In privity situations, the trend has been toward a rescission measure of damages.
See Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968). Because of the potential
liability, there would seem to be good reasons to limit open-market, non-privity
liability to an out-of-pocket measure. 'For a more thorough discussion of this
issue, see BROM1BERG § 8.7, at 213-20; Ruder 427-29.
"Ruder 427-29.
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substantially greater than Belock's would be because Texas Gulf Sulphur's
stock went from thirty dollars a share to an amazing one hundred and
sixty dollars a share during the alleged fraud,4T Belock still has a large
potential liability. For this reason, the amount of damages should be a
critical factor in determining ultimate liability under rule 10b-5.
Taking into account all four factors in Heit, the decision appears to
be correct. Few would disagree that privity, as in other fields, must not
be strictly required in open-market transactions if investors are to be
adequately protected. Regarding defendant's state of mind, the holding
of the court as to "knowing" violations is justified to deter wilful acts
of misconduct, and it is unimportant whether defendants engaged in
transactions at the time of the alleged violation because it was the mis-
representation of defendants, not their transactions, which caused the
plaintiffs' loss.48 The general policy behind the rule and the undesirable
consequences of immunity for a corporation under these circumstances
dictate liability despite the magnitude of the potential liability.
Under similar facts, however, liability should not extend to negligent
misrepresentation by the corporation. 9  In Texas Gulf Sadphur, the
court held that proof of negligence was sufficient to sustain an action for
injunctive relief under rule 10b-5(b), but at the same time found it
unnecessary to decide whether negligence would suffice in a private suit
for damages.50 Judge Friendly, however, in his concurring opinion
intimated that the appropriate standard in a private suit should embody a
scienter requirement.51 In Heit, the court again did not reach the issue.
2
There are several reasons why the line should be drawn at intentional
conduct. First, the potential damages, as pointed out above, are immense.
Furthermore, it would not further the goal of deterrence to any great
extent to hold the defendant liable for negligence. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, if a corporation is held liable for negligent misrepre-
sentations when it has no intent to harm, it will simply not say anything
rather than risk the possibility of liability. This silence will defeat the
primary purpose of rule 10b-5-a continuous flow of information for the
& Id.
BROMBERG § 8.7(2), at 217; Ruder 442.
'9 Ruder 442.
401 F.2d at 863.
Id. at 864-69.
"The question is troublesome .... There is no occasion for us to enter this
legal thicket as we pass only upon the legal sufficiency of the complaints to allege
a claim for relief." 402 F.2d at 913-14. The court held that plaintiffs' alternative
pleading of intent or negligence was sufficient to sustain the complaint. Id. at 914.
OPEN-MARKET TRANSACTIONS
investor. Of course, this last observation raises the intriguing question
as to whether a corporation not in privity, which is not engaging in
securities transactions, can be liable under rule lOb-5 for deliberate and
knowing nondisclosure. The answer would seem to be no. 3
A final factor to be considered in any decision concerning corporate
liability is the question of who in the corporation will bear the ultimate
burden of the liability. Conceivably, the ultimate burden may fall on
innocent shareholders of the corporate defendant when the corporation
has to pay these awards. It is unlikely that management will be tagged with
the ultimate burden, and this should be an important consideration in
formulating an appropriate remedy.
5 4
Thus, Heit and Texas Gulf Sulphur raise some very crucial questions.
Counsel for defendants in Heit have filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court.55 Although the Supreme Court has never spoken directly
on rule lOb-5, its general remarks in the securities field have been pro-
investor.5" Because of the implications of these cases, it is important
for Congress or the Court to speak soon.
Assuming that Congress does not act, it is interesting to speculate
as to what the Supreme Court might do with this problem. It would
seem that an analogy5" could be drawn between the problem in Heit and
the problem the Court faced in New York Times v. Sullivan.5" In Sullivan,
the Court used "definitional balancing" 9 to reconcile the state libel laws
5' [W]here the violation is nondisclosure, the defendant's duty to disclose
arises from the "inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage
of such information." . . . . Since the non-trading, nondisclosing defendant
has not taken advantage of the information, it can hardly be said that he
has violated his duty, for that duty is said to arise from his use of inside
information when it is unfair for him to do so.
Ruder 442.
" Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1370 (1967);
Symposiu -Ride 10b-5: Developments in the Law, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 523 (1968).
", 37 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Jan. 2, 1969) (No. 894).
"See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
The Court held that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21
(1964), "like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding
fraud,'" must be construed "not technically and restrictively but flexibly to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes." 375 U.S. at 195. "The broad policy of affording
broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant
formulae." SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (interpreting
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964)).
" See Comment, Securities Regulation: SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 252, 262-63 (1968).
58376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Time to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968).
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and the first amendment right of free speech with regard to public officials.
The Court held the standard to be one of actual malice, that is, knowledge
that a statement is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. Of course Heit is distinguishable in many respects, primarily
because Congress could presumably legislate a negligence standard if it so
desired without running afoul of the Constitution. Absent congressional
action, however, and in view of the competing policy goals-preventing
fraud without interfering with the flow of corporate information-the
Sullivan line would be an appropriate resolution of the matter. Until then,




Securities Regulation-In Pari Delicto as a Defense for a Violation
of Rule Lob-5
In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,' the plaintiff had become acquainted
through business dealings with the defendant, president of Texstar, and
a personal friendship had soon developed. Over a period of five months,
the defendant continuously supplied the plaintiff with inside information
consisting of assurances of increased stock dividends and proposed profit-
able business dealings with two major oil companies. Relying primarily
on this confidential information,2 the plaintiff began buying Texstar stock
on margin on the open market. None of the value-enhancing occurrences
ever materialized, and the plaintiff was forced to sell his stock and suffered
a large financial loss.' The federal district court held that the plaintiff was
a tippee under Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 4 and denied
"0 Symposiu-Rule 10b-5: Developments in the Law, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 544
(1968) (suggesting that no insurance be allowed corporate executives for inten-
tional or negligent violations of rule lOb-5).
1286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968). On May 9, 1969, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed by a 2-1 decision. - F.2d - (1969).'Apparently, another reason for Kuehnert's purchases was to help defendant
retain the presidency of the company. Brief for Appellee at 5-9, Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1969).
286 F. Supp. at 342-43.
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
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